Veröffentlichungen zu Schnüffeltechniken
(fixed some ttypos) |
|||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
<iimg>[[Publications about tracking and spying technologies]]![[Image:en2.png]]</iimg><iimg>[[Veröffentlichungen zu Schnüffeltechniken]]![[Image:de2.png]]</iimg> [[Hauptseite|Hauptseite (de)]] | <iimg>[[Publications about tracking and spying technologies]]![[Image:en2.png]]</iimg><iimg>[[Veröffentlichungen zu Schnüffeltechniken]]![[Image:de2.png]]</iimg> [[Hauptseite|Hauptseite (de)]] | ||
| + | |||
== Veröffentlichungen zu Schnüffeltechniken == | == Veröffentlichungen zu Schnüffeltechniken == | ||
=== Protect Yourself from Intrusive Laptop and Phone Searches at the U.S. Border === | === Protect Yourself from Intrusive Laptop and Phone Searches at the U.S. Border === | ||
| − | |||
| − | Download des PDF: [https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/EFF-border-search_0.pdf von der EFF] ([https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/paper/EFF-border-search_0.pdf lokale Kopie]) | + | ''Zusammenfassung'': Die EFF informiert über die Praxis der US-Grenzbehörden, bei Einreise in die USA die elektronischen Geräte (Laptops, Smartphones) zu beschnüffeln und gibt Hinweise, wie man sich dagegen schützen kann. Verschlüsselung der Festplatten hilft nicht, da die US-Behörden das Passwort verlangen können und bei Weigerung der Herausgabe das Passwortes den Laptop zur weiteren Untersuchung einziehen dürfen. Statt dem eigenen Smartphone mit vielen privaten Daten sollte man mit mit einem temporär genutztem Zweit-Handy in die USA einreisen und nur die SIM-Karte übernehmen. |
| + | |||
| + | Download des PDF: [https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/EFF-border-search_0.pdf von der EFF] ([https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/paper/EFF-border-search_0.pdf lokale Kopie]) 1/2 MiB PDF | ||
===Flash Cookies and Privacy II: Now with HTML5 and ETag Respawning=== | ===Flash Cookies and Privacy II: Now with HTML5 and ETag Respawning=== | ||
| + | |||
''Zusammenfassung:'' In this followup study, we reassess the Flash cookies landscape and examine a new tracking vector, HTML5 local storage and Cache-Cookies via ETags. We found over 5,600 standard HTTP cookies on popular sites, over 4,900 were from third parties. Google-controlled cookies were present on 97 of the top 100 sites, including popular government websites. Seventeen sites were using HTML5, and seven of those sites had HTML5 local storage and HTTP cookies with matching values. Flash cookies were present on 37 of the top 100 sites. We found two sites that were respawning cookies, including one site – hulu.com – where both Flash and cache cookies were employed to make identifiers more persistent. The cache cookie method used ETags, and is capable of unique tracking even where all cookies are blocked by the user and “Private Browsing Mode” is enabled. | ''Zusammenfassung:'' In this followup study, we reassess the Flash cookies landscape and examine a new tracking vector, HTML5 local storage and Cache-Cookies via ETags. We found over 5,600 standard HTTP cookies on popular sites, over 4,900 were from third parties. Google-controlled cookies were present on 97 of the top 100 sites, including popular government websites. Seventeen sites were using HTML5, and seven of those sites had HTML5 local storage and HTTP cookies with matching values. Flash cookies were present on 37 of the top 100 sites. We found two sites that were respawning cookies, including one site – hulu.com – where both Flash and cache cookies were employed to make identifiers more persistent. The cache cookie method used ETags, and is capable of unique tracking even where all cookies are blocked by the user and “Private Browsing Mode” is enabled. | ||
| − | [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1898390 Social Science Research Network] | + | [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1898390 Social Science Research Network] ([https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/paper/flashcookies_and html5.pdf lokale Kopie]) 1.7 MiB PDF |
Revision as of 08:11, 22 January 2012
Veröffentlichungen zu Schnüffeltechniken
Protect Yourself from Intrusive Laptop and Phone Searches at the U.S. Border
Zusammenfassung: Die EFF informiert über die Praxis der US-Grenzbehörden, bei Einreise in die USA die elektronischen Geräte (Laptops, Smartphones) zu beschnüffeln und gibt Hinweise, wie man sich dagegen schützen kann. Verschlüsselung der Festplatten hilft nicht, da die US-Behörden das Passwort verlangen können und bei Weigerung der Herausgabe das Passwortes den Laptop zur weiteren Untersuchung einziehen dürfen. Statt dem eigenen Smartphone mit vielen privaten Daten sollte man mit mit einem temporär genutztem Zweit-Handy in die USA einreisen und nur die SIM-Karte übernehmen.
Download des PDF: von der EFF (lokale Kopie) 1/2 MiB PDF
Flash Cookies and Privacy II: Now with HTML5 and ETag Respawning
Zusammenfassung: In this followup study, we reassess the Flash cookies landscape and examine a new tracking vector, HTML5 local storage and Cache-Cookies via ETags. We found over 5,600 standard HTTP cookies on popular sites, over 4,900 were from third parties. Google-controlled cookies were present on 97 of the top 100 sites, including popular government websites. Seventeen sites were using HTML5, and seven of those sites had HTML5 local storage and HTTP cookies with matching values. Flash cookies were present on 37 of the top 100 sites. We found two sites that were respawning cookies, including one site – hulu.com – where both Flash and cache cookies were employed to make identifiers more persistent. The cache cookie method used ETags, and is capable of unique tracking even where all cookies are blocked by the user and “Private Browsing Mode” is enabled.
Social Science Research Network (html5.pdf lokale Kopie) 1.7 MiB PDF
